How can the parties' goals in military character in Idlib be read? What is the preferred military method in Idlib? Turkey's Spring Shield launched a strategic military post February 27, 2020 What is the scope of the Operation? What has enabled the successful use of UAV / SİHA systems despite Russia, which maintains control of the airspace? Could there be a change in the military strategy in the coming period?
1. How can the parties' goals in military character be read in Idlib?
Russia and Iran supported regime elements; Take control of the M4 and M5 road on the first stage and Idlib in northern Syrian population in the region except the eastern gather in the narrow space in the Turkish border, in the second phase seize Idlib completely and to force the Syrian population migration to Turkey, Idlib seize the subsequent PKK / PYD In coordination with Turkey, it aims to prepare to repeat the same military maneuvers in other secured areas in the Turkish border, especially Afrin.
Russia's military aim within the scope of the strategic perspective built upon the survival of the regime is; It is seen that the security bases of Latakia and Hmeynim military bases are provided.
It can be said that Iran aims to support the regime through its militia and to make its military presence felt a necessity for the regime in order to consolidate its presence in Syria.
Apart from Russia and Iran, the regime aims at the PKK / PYD's aim and method in line with the developments in Idlib; Afrin, Firat Shield Operation and fret Turkey by attacks in a low profile in Peace Fountain of Operation regions of Turkey in this framework Syria in check and build of impression in the public and non-public opinion provides security could not for, in case of withdrawal from the region the United States with Russia and the regime It is understood that preparing favorable conditions for cooperation, using attacks such as bomb laden vehicles and long-range shots as methods to achieve these goals.
Diet, Russia, Iran and the PKK / PYD's Idlib Turkey's military objectives in military purposes, compared with levels in private; by repelling the regime's military action against Idlib; ensure the continuity of the plant been political compromise, in other words, the opposite side to "force peace", Idlib settled could and pass Turkey's security and prevent terrorist embodiments that can threaten, preventing displacement of human drama with ingenuity "responsible states" the necessity of being, instead of using military force if necessary bringing, as well as the long-term social, economic, etc. of migration. it is seen that its effects are prevented by military force in the early period.
2.What is the preferred military method in Idlib?
In Idlib, it was observed that the aggressive attitude that the regime elements made into continuity was in the form of small ground maneuvers supported by air operations. In this framework, a military strategy was followed to capture critical settlements and land sections prior to the wide-ranging operation that has been initiated. However, with the initiation of a wide-ranging operation; It is aimed to make progress in Idlib from the east, east and south of Idlib. In this way, it was aimed to break the integrity of the opposition elements known to be unorganized, and to force the M4 and M5 highways to be pulled to the northwest, and it was aimed to move the Syrians living in the said regions in the direction of the Turkish raspberry.
Especially, the attack started in the east of Idlib was directed towards the Cilvegözü border gate direction, in this way, it was aimed to cut the supply lines of Turkish observation points. Therefore, the regime wanted to carry out compelling maneuvers to evacuate Turkish observation points.
Turkey, be able to read in the execution of the purpose and intent campaign by the regime, primarily in this context Turkey has reinforced the observation point in the context of deterrence. However, with the new elements it referred to the region, it increased the number of Turkish observation points, thereby providing depth in the strengthening and raising the security measures. As the regime continued its attacks, it increased the amount of military power it referred to Idlib and made a deterrent accumulation. Due to the relatively flat character of the land and the small and scattered structure of the settlements, military accumulation was established around the settlements. In addition, the encouraging military entity was placed in the region in order that the people of Idlib should not leave the region. Due to the restrictions on airspace usage, TSK; storm howitzers launch multi-barrel rockets,
densification of regime elements attacks in Russia's goals, regardless of the reservations made in the airstrike in the disproportionate use of force and the Turkish troops along with the targeting Turkey, in addition to running diplomatic channels, the Syrian National Army (SMO) has increased its support. In this context, as a result of the support provided by the black fire support vehicles, SMO was able to stop the attacks of the regime army, which concentrated in the Serakip region and resulted in the loss of the M4 and M5 road junction. The conflicts that reached the "satisfaction" point in the west of Serakip forced the regime to focus on the south of Idlib. On the other hand, Turkish fire support vehicles managed to create a “fire dam” in front of the regime elements and prevented the regime from moving in the direction of the Turkish raspberry. Therefore, the regime started to target Turkish elements directly.
3.Turkey's Spring Shield launched a strategic military post February 27, 2020 What is the scope of the Operation?
Regime elements of the Turkish observation points to the supply of and supplements to the Armed Forces who have made the transition elements for the purpose of air attacks, has changed Turkey's military strategy. The military strategy, which was shaped in the direction of supporting SMO, has evolved into a modest and proactive face with the declaration of the regime elements as a legitimate target. In this framework, while military maneuvers were limited, it was observed that fire support vehicles performed violent fire practices against previously determined targets and regime elements that emerged suddenly. In addition, SMO's forward operation was encouraged. Thus, an operation was initiated and captured to regain critical areas, especially Serakip.
When deployed in Russia's airspace restrictions for the use of air defense systems and taken into consideration, Turkey, with warplanes have destroyed the targets previously determined before the Turkish border. Within this framework, SA-17 and SA-22 positions were neutralized and the efficiency of the regime and Russian air defense systems were reduced by activating the radars of other air defense systems less. However, by restricting the regime and the Russian air defense systems in the said airstrikes, the operation against the Russians was restricted and diplomatic and political channels were kept open in this way. Following the reduction of the air defense threat, effective use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV / SİHA) in the region has been opened.
5.What has enabled the successful use of UAV / SİHA systems despite Russia, which maintains control of the airspace?
in Turkey's inventory and can remain for a long time at high altitude and therefore operative level in a EDHR (UAVs system) that UAV and sihai are changed military equilibrium after 27 February. While the long-range shots fired by SOM series ammunition behind the border of the Turkish Air Force affected critical facilities in the target lists, SİHAs emerged as “operational multiplier” with their ability to serve at high altitudes and for a long time. Sihai to be achieved in 2018 the integration of the advantages and advanced command via satellite-guided munitions, sihai in Turkey's hand against regime elements and facilities battlefield has become an effective tool.
The tactical pursued also provided an important advantage in the effective use of SİHAs. SIAs were used gradually and layered to support each other, and after the destruction of air defense targets, other IHASs were allowed to be placed on the field. Within this framework, tactical UAVs were commissioned and the IHAS layer and depth were consolidated. In this framework, while the tactical-level SIHAs are directed towards the targets determined suddenly, the operative-level SIHAs are directed deeply towards strategic targets and the destruction of critical regime and weapon systems of the regime together with the moving targets. Although the herd UAV system is not used, it is ensured that the existing UAV systems are used simultaneously in different regions and in accordance with the target diversity.
Thanks to the high altitude, long tenure and increased range of operative level IHASs, the ability to target the regime's airport, ammunition depot and critical leaders not only in Idlib but beyond Idlib has affected the regime in three different ways. The targeting of critical facilities first destroyed the regime's sense of trust from Russian air defense systems. Latter; The destruction of the ammunition depots by means of SİHAs also had a negative effect on the continuation of the regime's combat power. Finally, the regime lost its psychological superiority, and it turned out that despite the support of Russia in a narrow space like Idlib, it would not get results. The resulting UAV / sihai of the successful use, Turkey; By combining intelligence, fire support and strategy, it turned the military course in favor.
5.Could there be a change in military strategy in the coming period?
In the resolution of the ongoing Idlib crisis, the political tools are not exhausted, and the use of military options restricts open and modest use. Therefore Turkey, due to the depletion of political options strategy changes should be expected to go to the military. Turkey, the military regime elements from the military operation for the complete removal of Idlib, to maneuver their troops directly involved in land, military strategy will be put into a different phase. On the other hand, the military strategy should not be limited to Idlib after the conditions such as the regime and pro-Iranian elements are exhausted, and Russia is prevented from intervening in the region. Finally, it is possible to experience new “Idlib” crises in the south of Tel Rıfat, Münbiç and other security-secured regions, as long as the regime and terrorist threat continues.